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Abstract. This paper examines the strategies for the implementation of corporate social 
responsibility of various multinationals, with a particular focus on the oil industry. The 
role of non-governmental organisations towards inducing a more responsible behaviour 
is explored. By drawing on literature and reflecting on documented actions of various 
multinational corporations, particularly from the extractive sector, we find a commonalty 
that cuts across the board: a considerable disparity exists between policies, strategies and 
actions that these organisations display in the interest of their inherent, short-term eco-
nomic gains. Such gains jeopardize interests of both internal and external stakeholders as 
well as the environment especially in the developing world. We argue that the disparity in 
implementation can be linked to weak structural institutions and lack of ethical standards 
in most developing countries.
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Introduction
The turn of the century has witnessed a momentous growth in the corporate world. 
This has brought about dramatic changes to the way people live and how societies 
and economies operate and interact. As a consequence, there have been unprecedented 
implications on ecosystems and the environment. Multinational corporations (MNCs) 
have today infiltrated our lives to an extent beyond which there is no recourse. Over the 
years, however, there has been an increasing pressure on them to clean up their act and 
behave more responsibly towards the planet and its people. Corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) has been hailed by many as an effective way by which these commercial 
giants will think and behave more conscientiously and thus have a positive impact on 
countless individuals, societies and the environment. 
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Expressions such as corporate responsibility, corporate citizenship, good corporate 
governance, and “the ethical corporation” have today become mainstream terms in 
development thinking. Mazurkiewicz (2004) states that although the concept has been 
evolving since the early 1970s, there is no single, commonly accepted definition of 
CSR. Instead, there are different perceptions of the concept amongst the private sector, 
governments, and civil society organizations. Depending on the perspective, CSR may 
cover three main areas: first, a company running its business responsibly in relation to 
internal stakeholders (shareholders, employees, customers and suppliers); second, the 
role of businesses in relationship to the state, locally and nationally, as well as business 
role to inter-state institutions, and third, CSR business performance as a responsible 
member of the society in which it operates in the global community (ibid.). The EU’s 
Green Paper (2001: 6) states that “being socially responsible means not only fulfill-
ing legal expectations, but also going beyond compliance and investing “more” into 
human capital, the environment and the relations with stakeholders”. Baker (2007: 1) 
describes it simply as “a concept about how companies manage the business processes 
to produce an overall positive impact on society”. Waddock (2004, 2006) comes up 
with an even simpler description: the deliberate efforts that companies make to im-
prove society.
Sadly, our findings which we discuss in the sections that follow reveal that in strong 
contrast to the definitions put forth, MNCs do not appear to invest in human capital 
or the environment. Furthermore, they do not seem to be making a positive impact on 
the society at large. We draw on instances originating from the corporate behaviour of 
companies involved in the oil industry, particularly those based in the developing world 
to investigate how they comply with the principles and ethics of being responsible to 
all stakeholders.
Following this brief introduction, section one discusses the drivers of corporate respon-
sibility, while section two explores its strategic dimensions. Prior to concluding, section 
three explores organisational dilemmas relating to CSR with a particular emphasis on 
the extractive industry by using cases of Shell and Rio Tinto as illustrations. 
1. The drivers of corporate responsibility
According to Carroll (1983: 604) “CSR involves the conduct of a business so that it is 
economically profitable, law abiding, ethical and socially supportive. To be socially re-
sponsible then means that profitability and obedience to the law are foremost conditions 
when discussing the firm’s ethics and the extent to which it supports the society in which it 
exists with contributions of money, time and talent. Thus, CSR comprises four parts: eco-
nomic, legal, ethical and voluntary or philanthropic”. Carroll (1991) represents the concept 
in a pyramid and as shown in Figure 1, states that such sequencing “helps the manager 
to see that the different types of obligations are in a constant tension with one another”.
What drives organisations to be responsible? The internet, as well as print and elec-
tronic news media in today’s global economy, has resulted in an information revolution 
that places business practices around the world under constant spotlight. Consequently, 
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Fig. 1. Carroll’s (1991) pyramid of corporate social responsibility
organisations are increasingly being judged on the basis of their social and  environmental 
stewardship. Stakeholders at various levels want to know what goes on inside a compa-
ny as well as the management’s priorities and practices. They want to do business with 
companies in which they can trust and believe. Hence, this transparency of business 
practices means that for many companies, CSR is no longer a luxury but a requirement 
(Mazurkiewicz 2004: 2).
Essentially, the drivers of CSR comprise a mix of incentives and risks directed at com-
panies to improve operating standards. These drivers, as shown in Table 1, according 
to Mazurkiewicz (2004) are market-based, usually beginning when a firm anticipates 
or responds to a risk associated with the social, labour or environmental impact of a 
specific business practice. Mazurkiewicz identifies three fundamental types of drivers: 
economic, social and political. 
Economic drivers, as explained by Mazurkiewicz, are geared primarily towards fac-
tors that are more materialistic and quantifiable, such as the company’s image and 
Table 1. The drivers of corporate social responsibility
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reputation; pressures faced from external stakeholders such as competitors, custom-
ers, and investors. Competitiveness is another economic driver that plays a vital 
role in shaping a company’s strategy towards effective policy formulation. However, 
these could be seen as secondary compared to the primary economic driver which is 
profit given that the primary aim of the aforementioned drivers is to maximise profit. 
Social drivers are more focused on pressures faced from third sector organizations, 
watchdogs, NGOs, activists and local communities. Since the very concept of CSR 
pertains to social thinking and is meant to benefit individuals, societies and communi-
ties, social drivers play a very central role in shaping any organization’s strategy and 
approach towards designing its CSR policy. However, it is the political drivers that 
would determine the extent to which a company would comply with its CSR policy. 
This is because political drivers originate from legal and regulatory frameworks im-
posed by governments and also due to the pressures faced by way of political forces 
that come into play. 
2. Corporate social responsibility and strategic management 
Strategic management is a process that encompasses an integrated future-oriented mana-
gerial perspective that is outwardly focused, forward-thinking and performance-based 
(Kiggundu 1996). CSR, as seen above, could benefit both the society and the environ-
ment. The results are far-reaching and go beyond mere individuals and localities and 
encompass entire societies and communities. The question that arises is how and why 
should organisations be motivated to invest in enough resources to achieve such goals? 
The internal and external measures in effective policy formulation discussed above 
addressed some of these. Here, we look at how organizations tend to serve their own 
strategic business interests, while striving to comply with regulations and at the same 
time, serve the stakeholders and the environment.
“Corporate social responsibility (policy, program or process)”, according to Burke and 
Logsdon (1996: 496) “is strategic when it yields substantial business-related benefits 
to the firm, in particular by supporting core business activities and thus contributing to 
the firm’s effectiveness in accomplishing its mission”. The authors have identified five 
dimensions of corporate strategy which they state to be both critical to the success of 
the firm and useful in relating CSR policies, programs and processes to value creation. 
These are: centrality, specificity, proactivity, voluntarism and visibility. As shown in 
Figure 2, value creation is the outcome that firms strive to achieve by means of strategic 
management. These dimensions have been briefly described below.
Centrality measures the “closeness of fit between a CSR program and the firm’s mission 
and objectives” (ibid). It enables the management to continuously check if its strategies 
are in-line with the firm’s overall objectives as it tends to act as a feedback mechanism. 
An example of centrality may be the millions of dollars spent by car manufacturers in 
research and development each year to design engines that are more efficient in fuel 
economy and also cut CO2 emissions. Specificity refers to the firm’s ability to capture or 
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internalize the benefits of a CSR program, rather than simply creating collective goods 
which can be shared by others in the industry. “Proactivity reflects the degree to which 
activity is planned in anticipation of emerging economic, technological, social or politi-
cal trends and in the absence of crisis conditions. Proactivity has long been identified 
by business strategists as an important characteristic of planning and scanning systems” 
(Burke, Logsdon 1996: 498). Voluntarism has been described as the “scope of discre-
tionary decision-making by the firm and the absence of externally-imposed compliance 
requirements” (ibid.). Finally, visibility signifies the extent to which an organization 
gains observation and recognition from both internal and external stakeholders due to 
any form of business activity. The activity in question may be either deliberate (aimed 
at getting a positive visibility) or accidental (resulting in negative visibility). Table 2 
provides a number of examples of potentially strategic CSR activities. The benefits 
which they offer are listed in the last column.
3. Being socially irresponsible at the corporate level – the case of Royal 
Dutch Shell PLC, Rio Tinto and other multinationals 
Being socially responsible does not mean merely fulfilling legal requirements, donating 
to local charities and funding a couple of philanthropic projects. It comprises developing 
Fig. 2. The five dimensions of CSR and value creation as the intended outcome
Source: Authors’ construct.
Five dimensions of
strategic corporate social responsibility
Value  creation as th end-objective for strategic 
corporate social responsibility
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human capital, promoting and assisting development of the company and society, and 
taking solid measures to protect the environment. Only such deliberate and sincere 
efforts lead to building affable relations with stakeholders, both internal and external. 
Unfortunately, many corporate giants do not practice what they preach, especially in 
developing countries. Enormous pressures of tough competition lead them to take cer-
tain measures that jeopardize their responsibility as a corporate citizen in the global 
society. We will take the oil industry as an example. Within the extractive sector, the 
oil business is well-known to be rife with corruption, pollution and violation of human 
rights, especially where huge corporate giants drill oil in developing countries. Let us 
consider Shell’s operations in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria, West Africa and mining 
company of Rio Tinto in Indonesia.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2013), Nigeria is the 
largest oil producer in Africa and was the world’s fourth leading exporter of LNG in 
2012. Despite the billions raised in revenue each year, a majority of the population 
in the oil-rich Niger-Delta live in absolute poverty. Their livelihoods once depended 
predominantly on fishing and farming in and around the fertile river networks of the 
delta region that have been considerably destroyed. Today, these waters are heavily 
polluted with floating oil and the entire ecosystem has been destroyed due to acid-rain. 
Cases such as oil leakage, gas flaring, forest destruction, waste dumping, soil damage 
and water pollution affect communities at a phenomenal extent (Kamalu et al. 2002; 
Bloemink, de Clerck 2000). Consequently, hunger and desperation ultimately lead to 
extreme measures, such as theft of oil pipelines and the oil itself by tapping into the 
thousands of kilometres of pipelines that crisscross the Niger-Delta. Stolen oil pipes are 
sold as scrap metal and oil is used as fuel for cooking or selling on the black market. 
Unfortunately, such incidences end tragically in fires breaking out, and to-date thou-
sands had perished in accidents. According to data compiled by the BBC (2006) relat-
ing to fire-related deaths during the past few years, over three thousand people have 
perished and many more have been injured, the worst such disaster being the tragic fire 
that broke out in the oilfields at Jesse in 1998 in which over 1,000 were killed.
Shell is the largest oil company operating in Nigeria. Its global revenues of $368 bil-
lion and profits of $18.6 billion in 2010 made it the second-largest corporation in the 
world by revenues and profitability (BBC 2010). The magnitude of its operations make 
it a subject of particular scrutiny by stakeholders, especially environmental and human 
rights groups and local communities. This makes it all the more important for such 
companies to have a very effective and robust CSR policy. Shell’s General Business 
Principles (2010: 3) state that they will:
“…respect the human rights of our employees and conduct business as responsible 
corporate members of society, to comply with applicable laws and regulations, to sup-
port fundamental human rights in line with the legitimate role of business, and to give 
proper regard to health, safety, security and the environment…”.
Ironically, it has been involved in a series of violations and has been in the media con-
stantly over the past few years on matters relating to human rights violation, corruption 
and damage to the environment. In 2006, Nigeria’s Federal High Court ordered Shell 
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to pay a fine of $1.5 billion for environmental damage to the homeland of the Ijaws 
in the Niger-Delta. Shell refused to pay the fine claiming that it remains in the belief 
that it has strong grounds to appeal the compensation order. It has said that much of 
the environmental damage in the Niger-Delta was caused by saboteurs and reversed its 
data from 98 to 70 per cent after Amnesty International published an alternative report 
(Donovan 2013). In January 2013, a Dutch court ruled that Shell’s Nigeria subsidiary 
was responsible for oil pollution in Niger-Delta and ordered to pay damages. Although 
this is a step in the right direction, the court also exonerated Shell from four others 
including oil spills (Sekularac, Deutsch 2013). This is in sharp contrast to that of the 
April 2010 Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico which was seen as 
a national disaster in the USA and led to a media frenzy all over the world. Through 
pressure from the US government, BP created a $20 billion response fund apart from 
paying more than $75 million for the clean-up.
During 2002 in the Delta region in Nigeria, fourteen individual plaintiffs filed an action 
on the grounds that Shell violated international law and engaged in militarised com-
merce in a conspiracy with the former military government of Nigeria. The suit argued 
that Shell knowingly “instigated, planned, facilitated, and participated in unprovoked 
attacks by the Nigerian military against the unarmed residents of Ogoniland, resulting in 
extrajudicial murder, crimes against humanity, torture, rape, cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced exile and the deliberate destruction 
of private property” (Business Respect 2002). A UK-based NGO Friends of the Earth 
published an “alternative Shell report” called “Lessons Not Learned”, the third alterna-
tive Shell report which catalogues how despite commitments made in previous years, 
Shell still exhibits total disregard for the rights of the people living near its operations 
in many parts of the world. Shell responded with a robust riposte, disputing a number 
of claims made by the group (Friends of the Earth 2005).
Despite the millions that the company pumps into local economies worldwide to fund 
and support it’s socially responsible and “green” projects, it still continues to trample 
human rights and ignores rights of indigenous people. For a company that reportedly 
earned nearly $1.6 million per hour (Macalister 2011), it becomes very difficult to com-
prehend why it has continually failed the local communities, and why it continues to 
destroy the environment in which it operates. Sadly, despite extensive media coverage 
and public outcry in several parts of the world, Shell continues to vehemently deny any 
wrongdoing and continues its operations as ever. Estimated figures for Shell alone for 
carbon emissions in 2005 were 102m tones – more than what 150 countries produce 
collectively (Macalister 2007). The magnitude and scale of the pollution such as carbon 
emissions can only be guessed if the joint estimates of the three major companies (Shell, 
BP and ExxonMobil) are taken together. 
Another case is that of Texaco oil dumping in Ecuador forest and spill to Amazon River. 
Texaco which was in operation of an oil concession in Ecuador since 1964 until its 
merger with Chevron in 2001 discharged waste oil far more larger than the Gulf Oil 
spill according to report. The oil discharged has contaminated Amazon River and con-
tributed to high rise of cancer and other skin diseases in the region. According to New 
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York Times of May 2009 report, the toxic chemicals leaked into the soil, groundwater 
and stream are poisoning to the indigenous children and affecting their livelihoods. As a 
result, Chevron was taken to court by the indigenous people of Ecuador mostly affected 
by these activities. The court cases including $27 billion in damages for dumping more 
345 million gallons of crude oil in the rainforest and 18.5 gallons of toxic waste in pits in 
the forest (Khor 2010). These cases were linked to what the indigenous groups called en-
vironmental discrimination by Texaco citing 1996 minority discrimination lawsuit which 
was settled for $176 million (Souter 1999). Despite the settlement, Texaco maintained 
they have acted responsibly and have used standard industry practice and there is lack 
of scientific evidence to support the claim (Talbot 1999). 
For lack of legal precedent in Ecuador, the case was filed in the USA using the Alien 
Claims Tort Act of 1770 which was enacted by the congress in 1980s (Markels 1999).
The case was initially dismissed in 1996 but was overturned by the appeal court deci-
sion. The lack of legal institution in Ecuador posed a problem and a major challenge 
for Ecuador. It also echoes similar challenges in other developing countries with weak 
or no system to enforce corporate social responsibility. The case which has been trans-
formed to Chevron verses Ecuador tribe continues. In 2008, the US Congressman James 
P. McGovern, the vice-chairman of the House Rules Committee, visited Ecuador and 
reported in a letter to Obama that “the degradation and contamination left behind by 
Chevron in a poor part of the world made me angry and ashamed… I also saw the 
infrastructure Texaco/Chevron created that allowed the wholesale dumping of forma-
tion water and other highly toxic materials directly into the Amazon and its waters” 
(McGovern 2008).
The debate of the double standard by Multinational operations in the developing coun-
tries continues but the question remains, what are the developing countries doing to 
reduce the irresponsibility of multinationals in developing countries? This is because 
in some cases state officials enable MNC in unethical activities and to avoid their 
responsibilities. 
Let us consider the case of Rio Tinto, a British Australian company which is one of 
the largest mining companies in the world and is known for its several accolades as 
an ethical and environment-friendly company. In 2007, it was awarded the Corporate 
Social Responsibility Award and also the Nedbank Environmental Award. With these 
awards, one wonders what Rio Tinto could do wrong in its CSR activities. Despite 
such CSR awards, Rio Tinto’s operations have been less attractive in a lot of countries 
ranging from South Africa to the USA. Let us take Indonesia, one of their 35 countries 
as an example.
In West Papua, Rio Tinto in joint venture with Freeport McMoRan, was accused of 
causing massive environmental destruction due to the dumping of toxic waste metals 
into the Indonesian river system. The dumping polluted the river and lead to loss of 
means of livelihood and source of clean water by local communities. Also, Rio Tinto 
forcefully evicted the community from their land with people’s assets destroyed during 
the construction of the mine. It was reported by the Indonesian Human Rights Com-
mission that protesters were arrested and detained and in some instances, people were 
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shot while local police ran campaigns to squash the protest (Curtis 2007). Rio Tinto’s 
partner Freeport-McMoRon exploited the system by providing financial support to the 
military police and the government to ensure protection of the mine. The reality is that 
the multinationals are not alone in this type of destructive activities as in some cases 
government acts as accomplish. For example, Rio Tinto disagreed that the riverine dis-
posal is expressly prohibited under Indonesia’s water quality control regulation. The 
company argues that “this programme was approved by the government of Indonesia 
following numerous technical studies to identify the appropriate tailings management 
plan for the site”. This is part of factors that distinct the activities from developed to 
developing countries.
Compare the incident in Indonesia to that of Boron community in the USA where ac-
tion was taken against the company by the small miners who were disfranchised by the 
company. The community was able to mobilize support not only from the people but 
the State of California and the US government to fight for a fair contract. In a country 
like Indonesia the company got the support of the government while in the USA, the 
community got the support of the government. So although the operation and activities 
might be similar across countries, consequences differ. 
The above discussion indicates that corporations to a large extent, take their corporate 
strategic implementations seriously and where they are “caught out”, are held respon-
sible for their actions. However, while this might be the case in developed countries 
the contrast is glaring in developing countries. Examples discussed above where legal 
actions were taken successfully against unethical activities of corporations occurred in 
developed countries while legal action is hardly brought against corporations in most 
developing countries and even if taken, the corporations still get away with their irre-
sponsible actions as seen with the case of Shell’s activities in Nigeria as compared to 
the BP oil spill in the USA. Additionally, product recalls which have been carried out 
by several corporations, occurred only in developed countries. The question is why do 
corporations attempt to act responsibly in some regions and irresponsibly in others?
Lack of consensus on conceptualising CSR strategy is argued by some as one of the 
reasons it is not visible in the developing countries. For example, Visser (2005) suggests 
that values-based traditional philosophy of African humanism is what underpins much 
of the modern inclusive approaches to CSR on the continent. However, Schmidheiny 
(2006) argues that it is important for businesses to recognise socio-economic needs of 
a particular locality rather than importing foreign strategies. Locally developed CSR 
approaches are more likely to respond to the many social and environmental problems 
in the region, such as alternative means of livelihoods, provision of social infrastructure 
and job creation as in the case of the people of Niger Delta whose means of livelihoods 
have been destroyed due to oil exploration (De Oliveira 2006). Michael Spicer argues 
that “having CSR guided by the socio-economic priorities of the country or region is 
simply a good business” (Visser 2007: 11).
The poor impact of CSR strategies in developing countries could be attributed to fac-
tors such as asymmetrical power relations between the state, host communities and 
businesses interests. Moreover, lack of or weak institutions to enforce CSR strategies 
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and unethical culture of host countries that collaborate with and allow businesses to get 
away with unethical practices mitigate CSR strategies implementation in the develop-
ing world. Consequently, multinationals utilise and manipulate loopholes and structural 
weaknesses of key systems (political, economic and social) in these countries. This 
explains why some multinationals could easily get away with substantial ethical abuse, 
such as years of oil spills in the Niger-Delta.
Concluding remarks: the future of CSR and the role of NGOs
The case of the extractive sector in general, and Shell in particular along with other 
cases in the preceding section highlight the reality of many large corporations pledging 
to be socially responsible, yet acting otherwise. Integrating corporate social responsi-
bility into its core policy, acts as a long-term strategic investment, such as investing in 
human capital formation and building local communities. Since most of the companies 
tend to forget or neglect the social responsibilities and are inclined to focus on the rev-
enues that they expect to acquire, NGOs are faced with the responsibility of community 
advocacies. They play a vital part to remind businesses of their roles in the society and 
to follow the rules of the government and preserve the environment. Thus, community 
advocacy is an essential part of NGOs activities (Kelly 2002). 
The concept of the “Non-Governmental Organization” has matured well over the years 
which have witnessed a sudden surge in their formation, formalization and recognition 
on a global scale. They operate individually and collectively at all levels of society and 
have an impact on many aspects of peoples’ lives, ranging from their political and civil 
rights and obligations, to economic, social and cultural rights and opportunities. The 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD 2007: 1) reiterates the power-
ful role that NGOs play in today’s globalised economy:
“NGOs have helped to focus attention on the social and environmental externalities of 
business activity. Multinational brands have been acutely susceptible to pressure from 
activists and from NGOs eager to challenge a company’s labour, environmental or hu-
man rights record”.
The report goes on to state that due to such pressures, many businesses have been seen 
to abandon their Milton Friedmanite shareholder theory of value in favour of a broader, 
stakeholder approach. Such moves not only seek increased share value, but also tend to 
consider how such increased value can be attained. 
Although some CSR strategies are driven by genuine intentions to be responsible, to 
operate more conscientiously and thus have a positive impact on the stakeholders, socie-
ties and the environment; many MNCs’ CSR strategies have not been proactive enough 
in implementing their policies in developing countries. This consequently leads to an 
obvious contrast in implementation of such responsible strategies in developed and 
developing countries despite the influence of NGOs and the media. Hence, in reality, 
business implementation of CSR strategies depends largely on the region as well as a 
country’s structural strength and accountability of its institutions, the presence and role 
of NGOs and the general awareness of its people.
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